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Insurance policies are required, along with other measures,
to deal with the magnitude and depth of social and economic
risk in Latin America. The peculiarities of insurance markets
(such as the constraints of the pricing system, the intrinsic
characteristics of insurance as an economic good and its
dimensions as a public good, its externalities, and risk
selection with its adverse effects on equity and efficiency)
justify the consolidation of stable, appropriate risk
diversification and financing that is oriented by the principle
of solidarity, with funding either from compulsory
contributions or from the national budget. This paper
conducts a critical review of the postulates of so-called social
risk management, which limits State responsibilities in the
area of social protection to the provision of safety nets to
combat poverty, favours targeted policies over universal ones,
is dismissive of solidarity in insurance and stresses the
responsibility of individuals to insure themselves against
risk.
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I
Introduction
A variety of public policies are required to cope with
the depth and magnitude of social and economic risk
in the region. After discussing some dimensions of this
risk, the present paper analyses the peculiarities of
insurance markets, considering the constraints of the
pricing system, the intrinsic characteristics of insurance
as an economic good and its dimensions as a public
good, its externalities, and risk selection with its adverse
effects on equity and efficiency. These suggest a need
for insurance policies that consolidate stable,
appropriate risk diversification and financing that is
oriented by the principle of solidarity, with funding
either from compulsory contributions or from the
national budget.
This approach offers the basis for a critical look at
the postulates of social risk management, which
minimizes public-sector responsibility for social
protection in two ways: by limiting State responsibilities
to the use of safety nets to combat poverty and setting
off targeted policies against universal ones; and, in
respect of insurance, by undermining solidarity and
stressing individual responsibility in risk insurance.
The paper concludes with some thoughts about
insurance financing.
II
The magnitude and depth of economic
and social risk in the region
The uncertainty and risk faced by people in the Latin
America and Caribbean region include, among other
things, the economic insecurity resulting from sudden
drops in income, risks of an idiosyncratic kind and the
possibility that these might lead to catastrophic risks,
or a reduced ability to withstand shocks once these
become recurrent, so that household assets may be
progressively run down.1  This is what makes them
important for public policy.
The current external environment is adverse for
Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of demand
for the region’s products and the volatility of
international capital. The region can be characterized
in several respects as one of high social risk. Despite
positive tendencies in some countries (the steady
reduction of budget deficits, the maintenance of
macroeconomic balances, and restored or rising social
spending, for example), economic growth has been
unstable and low by historical standards. If an
international comparison is made, gross domestic
product (GDP) is twice as volatile in the region as in the
industrial countries, while the volatility of household
consumption is greater still, and has increased since
the 1980s (De Ferranti, Perry and others, 2000).2
Social vulnerability manifests itself in various
ways. In many countries, what is striking is the degree
to which poverty levels exceed the average; there was
a gradual reduction in poverty in the first seven years
of the 1990s, but this subsequently came to a halt. With
few exceptions, distribution indices have worsened.
Labour markets have weakened: non-permanent waged
work, the number of workers without social security
I am grateful for comments made on earlier versions of this
paper by Rebeca Grynspan, Juan Carlos Moreno, José Antonio
Ocampo and Eugenio Rivera, to which I have responded as far as
possible.
1
 Unlike aggregate, common or covariant risks, which affect most
people in particular groups alike, idiosyncratic risks affect
individuals or more specific groups of economic actors. The term
“catastrophic” alludes to the intensity of the risk.
2
 The volatility of GDP is measured by the standard deviation from
median real GDP growth, while the volatility of household
consumption is measured by the standard deviation from household
consumption growth (De Ferranti, Perry and others, 2000, p. 15).
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and low-quality employment have all increased.
Intermediate sectors have seen a decline in their
incomes or their income share, which means that it is
not only the poor and indigent who are suffering from
the region’s volatility and the tendency towards income
concentration.
A huge number of people who are not poor in
income terms are, nonetheless, vulnerable. In many
countries, almost a fifth of households have per capita
incomes of 1.25 to 2 poverty lines, while a further 7%
to 11% of households have incomes that are no more
than 25% above the poverty line. Two trends have been
observed in this respect, each displayed by a similar
number of countries: either these strata grew during
the 1990s, or they shrank, but not very significantly,
the exception being the large reduction seen in Uruguay
before the recent financial crisis (table 1).
In many countries, sectors that can be termed
“medium-low” in urban areas (i.e., the 30% of
households immediately above the poorest 40%)
experienced a decline in their share of total income over
the 1990s, sometimes of a similar degree to that
experienced by the poorest 40% (table 2).
It is also significant that in countries where the
number of poor and indigent households is decreasing,
the number of households lying just above the poverty
line is rising. This is the case in Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Panama and Paraguay (table 2). When an
appreciable percentage of households are subject to
sharp income changes in the short term, those close to
the poverty line may be the worst affected.3
In some cases, the beneficial effects of price
stabilization on household incomes are reduced by
patterns of employment instability, reflected in
joblessness and the spread of insecure employment
(Beccaria, 2001).4
The likelihood of income shocks affecting poor
and middle-income households has been similar in
some cases. The intergenerational effects of the
strategies used by middle-income sectors to cope with
such shocks, considering their tendency to recur, may
jeopardize the very constitution and survival of these
sectors: irrespective of their relative effectiveness in the
short term, the pernicious effects of the strategies they
employ may outlast the very shocks that triggered
them.5  The most common are: selling assets, reducing
human capital investment (especially in the second
quintile) and increasing workforce participation. In
these sectors, increasing the number of hours worked
or migrating are less common options6  (Gaviria, 2001,
pp. 11-13, 15 and 19).
The impoverishment of sectors that previously
participated in the formal labour market and were thus
able to earn adequate incomes and participate in
contributory insurance schemes is redefining the tasks
that the public sector needs to perform when people
from these sectors move to public health service
providers not linked with contributory schemes, add to
the demand for public-sector education or create a
greater need for programmes to keep students in the
education system.7
In a context of trade liberalization, meanwhile,
inadequate skills and constraints on the dissemination
of technical progress have widened the income gap
between the skilled and the unskilled. Around 2000,
the average incomes of people in Central America with
nine years or more of education were double or
quadruple those of the unskilled.8
Risk management in market-oriented societies
entails new public-sector responsibilities (Rodrik,
2001), and the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean are often starting out with various social
development shortcomings. The economic and social
risk to which people are exposed by the severity and
frequency of shocks depends on highly aggregated
economic variables and on the social development of
the countries in the context of their political systems.
The public policies concerned, therefore, have to
operate on very different levels.
Where macroeconomic policies are concerned, it
is essential to ensure that these are stable, sustainable
and growth-oriented, and to establish strict financial
regulation and oversight standards along with
instruments to create greater room for manoeuvre in
3
 For the two-year period 1991-1992, a panel-type grouping of the
household survey sample for Greater Buenos Aires established that
movements into and out of poverty were more frequent among
households close to the poverty line (Minujin and López, 1993).
4
 Measurements made using data panels constructed with household
survey information.
5 Specific survey on household responses to income shocks,
conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 2000
in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay
and Venezuela, with a sample of about 1,000 households in each
country (Gaviria, 2001).
6 Although migration has been an important resource in Argentina
recently.
7 See Kessler (various undated papers cited in the bibliography)
and Feijóo (2001).
8 According to special tabulations created by ECLAC on the basis of
household surveys in the countries around 2000.
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TABLE 1
Latin America (17 countries): Household distribution by per capita income
bands as multiples of the poverty line, urban areas, 1990-1999
Year Per capita income bands as multiples of the poverty line
Country 0 to 0.5 0.5 to 0.9 0.9 to1.0 0.0 to 1.0 1.0 to 1.25 1.25 to 2.0 2.0 to 3 Over 3.0
Indigent Poor
Argentina 1990 3.5 10.6 2.1 16.2 7.3 22.5 18.7 35.3
Greater Buenos Aires 1994 1.5 6.6 2.1 10.2 7.4 16.7 19.0 46.7
1977 3.3 7.0 2.8 13.1 7.2 19.0 17.5 43.2
1999 3.1 8.5 1.6 13.2 6.2 19.1 17.8 43.9
Bolivia 1989 22.1 23.1 4.1 49.3 9.0 16.4 10.6 14.5
1994 16.9 24.3 4.6 45.8 9.8 19.3 10.2 14.9
1997 19.2 22.6 5.1 46.8 9.7 17.2 11.2 15.2
1999 16.4 20.8 5.1 42.3 10.8 8.5 11.4 17.0
Brazila 1990 14.8 17.3 3.7 35.8 8.3 16.6 12.3 27.1
1993 13.5 16.0 3.8 33.3 8.5 19.0 13.3 26.0
1996 9.7 11.9 3.1 24.6 7.3 17.5 15.5 35.1
1999 9.9 13.1 3.4 26.4 8.0 18.1 15.3 32.3
Chile 1990 10.2 18.5 4.5 33.2 9.5 20.3 14.3 22.7
1994 5.9 13.3 3.6 22.8 8.5 20.7 16.6 31.4
1996 4.6 11.8 3.4 19.8 8.5 20.5 17.2 34.1
1998 4.4 10.4 3.0 17.8 7.7 20.0 17.7 36.7
Colombiab 1994 16.2 20.3 4.1 40.6 9.1 18.2 12.6 19.5
1997 14.6 20.3 4.5 39.5 9.6 18.9 12.6 19.4
1999 18.7 21.5 4.4 44.6 9.5 17.7 10.8 17.4
Costa Rica 1990 7.3 11.2 3.7 22.2 7.9 21.9 20.2 27.9
1994 5.7 9.1 3.4 18.2 7.9 20.4 20.7 32.9
1997 5.2 9.0 2.8 17.0 8.1 20.5 20.3 34.0
1999 5.4 7.9 2.3 15.6 8.5 19.3 17.7 38.8
Ecuador 1990 22.6 28.1 5.2 55.8 10.5 16.7 8.8 8.2
1994 22.4 24.7 5.2 52.3 10.1 19.1 9.1 9.4
1997 18.6 25.6 5.6 49.8 10.0 19.4 10.7 10.0
1999 27.2 25.5 5.3 58.0 7.9 16.1 7.9 10.1
El Salvador 1995 12.5 22.4 5.1 40.0 12.0 22.0 12.8 13.3
1997 12.0 21.8 4.8 38.6 11.0 21.8 13.6 15.0
1999 11.1 19.0 3.9 34.0 9.8 21.7 15.4 19.1
Guatemala 1989 22.9 21.0 4.3 48.2 8.5 17.3 11.0 15.0
1998 12.9 21.8 4.2 38.9 10.9 20.0 12.5 17.8
Honduras 1990 38.0 22.7 3.8 64.5 8.2 12.0 6.5 8.8
1994 40.8 24.5 4.3 69.6 7.6 12.0 5.1 5.8
1997 36.8 26.0 4.2 67.0 8.2 12.5 5.9 6.4
1999 37.7 24.4 4.2 66.2 8.2 12.9 6.4 7.0
Mexico 1989 9.3 19.8 4.8 33.9 11.0 22.3 13.1 19.8
1994 6.2 18.2 4.6 29.0 10.8 21.8 14.4 24.0
1996 10.0 22.2 5.3 37.5 10.7 21.3 12.4 18.1
1998 6.9 19.1 5.1 31.1 11.0 22.0 15.3 20.6
Nicaragua 1993 32.2 23.5 4.6 60.3 8.2 15.7 6.9 9.0
1998 30.7 24.1 4.5 59.3 8.6 15.8 7.6 8.7
(Continued on next page)
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implementing countercyclical policies using resources
raised during periods of growth and financial euphoria
(Ocampo, 2001).
Productive development and labour market policies
are crucial because their effects spread so widely.
Simulations of the individual impact of shocks,
considering the diversification of the production
structure and changes in productivity, yield important
findings. In Costa Rica, higher productivity appears to
be a necessary condition for the trade liberalization
process to have a positive impact overall, and the
relationship between trade liberalization, higher
productivity and poverty reduction is confirmed (Sauma
and Sánchez, 2003, p. 24).
Productive development policies are closely linked
to education and occupational training policies, and
social risk and insurance costs will rise when education
quality deteriorates and education is expanded
asymmetrically. This is because an education of poor
quality and limited relevance affects people’s future
employment prospects, while reducing the quality of
human capital and the flexibility with which people can
respond to change.
Although the region is at an advanced stage in the
demographic transition, it still displays demographic
syndromes associated with poverty and vulnerability:
high fertility is the rule in the lower strata and among
groups with little or no education, and fertility by age
17 has risen. The high fertility of young women (20-
29) reveals a continuing trade-off between the demands
of parenthood and the accumulation of educational
assets or work experience (Rodríguez, 2003). Later we
shall discuss the prevalence of a polarized
epidemiological transition.
Insurance policies are also required to cope with
the economic and social risks referred to, and the
way in which they are financed needs to reflect the
complexity of these markets. We shall now look at
this issue, with reference to the literature on
insurance.
Table 1 (continued)
Year Per capita income bands as multiples of the poverty line
Country 0 to 0.5 0.5 to 0.9 0.9 to1.0 0.0 to 1.0 1.0 to 1.25 1.25 to 2.0 2.0 to 3 Over 3.0
Indigent Poor
Panama 1991 13.9 15.5 4.2 33.6 8.5 17.0 13.7 27.2
1994 8.7 13.2 3.4 25.3 7.7 19.2 16.5 31.3
1997 8.6 12.2 3.7 24.6 7.5 18.8 15.4 33.7
1999 6.6 10.9 3.3 20.8 7.6 18.2 16.2 37.1
Paraguay (Asuncion) 1990 10.4 21.7 4.7 36.8 13.6 19.6 14.2 15.9
1994 9.5 20.9 5.0 35.4 11.6 20.4 13.4 19.3
1996 8.0 19.2 6.4 33.5 11.3 22.2 13.5 19.5
1999 6.9 20.7 5.2 32.8 11.9 19.9 16.2 19.2
Dominican Republic 1997 11.0 16.6 4.0 31.6 10.4 21.5 15.6 21.0
Uruguay 1990 2.0 7.0 2.8 11.8 7.1 22.7 23.1 35.3
1994 1.1 3.4 1.3 5.8 3.6 15.4 23.2 52.0
1997 0.9 3.5 1.4 5.7 4.0 15.2 21.4 53.8
1999 0.9 3.4 1.4 5.7 3.6 13.5 20.5 56.9
Venezuelac 1990 10.9 17.5 5.0 33.4 10.9 21.5 14.8 19.4
1994 13.5 22.0 5.4 40.9 10.4 21.4 12.9 14.4
1997 16.5 21.2 4.6 42.3 10.6 19.3 11.5 16.3
1999 18.8 21.0 4.2 44.0 10.3 19.5 11.5 14.8
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys in the countries concerned.
a In Brazil, the poverty line was calculated by multiplying the value of the indigence line by a variable, unfixed coefficient (2.0).
b From 1993 the geographical coverage of the survey was extended to virtually the entire urban population of the country. Up until 1992
the survey covered about half of this population, except in 1991 when a national survey was conducted.
c From 1997 the sample design of the survey means that urban and rural figures cannot be separated. Figures are therefore national totals.
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TABLE 2
Latin America (15 countries): Level and distribution of household income,
urban and rural areas,a 1990-1999
(Percentages)
Average Total income share of:
Country Year income Poorest Next 20% below Richest
40% 30% richest 10% 10%
Argentinac 1990 10.6 14.9 23.6 26.7 34.8
1997 12.4 14.9 22.3 27.1 35.8
1999 12.5 15.4 21.6 26.1 37.0
Bolivia 1989d 7.7 12.1 22.0 27.9 38.2
1997 7.2 13.6 22.5 26.9 37.0
1999 7.2 15.2 24.1 28.0 32.7
Brazil 1990 10.4 10.3 19.4 28.5 41.8
1996 13.6 10.5 18.1 27.0 44.3
1999 12.3 10.6 17.7 26.1 45.7
Chile 1990 9.4 13.4 21.2 26.2 39.2
1996 13.5 13.4 20.9 26.4 39.4
2000 14.1 14.0 20.9 25.4 39.7
Colombia 1994 9.0 11.6 20.4 26.1 41.9
1997 8.4 12.9 21.4 26.1 39.5
1999 7.3 12.6 21.9 26.6 38.8
Costa Rica 1990 9.6 17.8 28.7 28.9 24.6
1997 10.5 17.3 27.6 28.4 26.8
1999 11.9 16.2 26.8 29.9 27.2
Ecuador 1990 5.5 17.1 25.4 27.0 30.5
1997 6.0 17.0 24.7 26.4 31.9
1999 5.6 14.1 22.8 26.5 36.6
El Salvador 1995 6.9 17.3 25.1 25.8 31.7
1997 7.1 17.2 24.8 26.9 31.1
1999 7.7 16.3 25.9 28.6 29.2
Guatemala 1989 7.7 12.1 22.6 27.4 37.9
1998 8.8 14.7 22.0 26.0 37.5
Honduras 1990 5.5 12.2 20.8 28.1 38.9
1997 4.7 14.3 22.8 26.1 36.8
1999 4.6 14.3 24.0 27.9 33.9
Mexico 1989 9.6 16.3 22.0 24.9 36.9
1994 9.7 16.8 22.8 26.1 34.3
1998 8.6 17.2 22.3 25.7 34.8
Nicaragua 1993 6.1 12.9 23.6 26.9 36.5
1998 6.4 12.3 22.3 26.4 39.1
Panama 1991 9.5 13.3 23.9 28.6 34.2
1997 12.0 13.3 22.4 27.0 37.3
1999 12.2 14.2 23.9 26.8 35.1
Paraguay 1990e 7.7 18.6 25.7 26.9 28.9
1996 7.4 16.7 24.6 25.3 33.4
1999 7.1 16.5 24.9 25.8 32.8
Uruguay 1990 9.3 20.1 24.6 24.1 31.2
1997 11.2 22.0 26.1 26.1 25.8
1999 11.9 21.6 25.5 25.9 27.0
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys in the countries concerned.
a Households in every area of the country ranked by per capita income.
b Average monthly household income as multiple of the per capita poverty line.
c Greater Buenos Aires.
d Eight largest cities and El Alto.
e Metropolitan area of Asunción.
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III
Social risk and the challenges of insurance
The welfare State is much more than a safety net;
it is justified not simply by any redistributive aims
one may (or may not) have, but because it does things
which private markets for technical reasons either
would not do at all, or would do inefficiently. We need
a welfare State of some sort for efficiency reasons,
and would continue to do so even if all the distributional
problems had been solved (Barr, 1993).
It is not just when market mechanisms are absent or
dysfunctional or break down that State action or
compulsory participation in a pool of risks is important,
since information asymmetries and market failures are
not the exception, but are inherent in insurance
markets.9  State regulatory action, public insurance and
social insurance by private-sector insurers but with
compulsory financing mechanisms and regulations to
ensure risk diversification are different ways of dealing
with risk selection and raising efficiency in these
markets, as they bring stability to insurance. When
social financing is opted for, the objectives are also
redistributive and it is possible to create cross-subsidies
among income strata, age groups, risk groups and so
on.
Information asymmetries and market failures in
insurance stem from numerous factors, chiefly: adverse
selection; moral hazard; complexity and lack of
transparency in the nature and quality of the product
(insurance and all the different types of benefits)
available to the consumer; the complexity and
heterogeneity of the product associated with the
insurance (such as medical benefits); the externalities
of consumption; and underconsumption resulting from
inability to pay private insurance premiums because of
low incomes or chronic or congenital diseases, in which
case there will be no access to insurance even if the
market exists.
Of course, the amount and quality of the social
protection that can be funded from compulsory
contributions, the general State budget or a combination
of the two will depend both on the level of economic
development that makes this possible and on the fiscal
pacts that exist, which also embody political and social
agreements regarding the level of welfare to which
citizens should be entitled (ECLAC, 2000).
Policies targeted strictly on poor sectors are not enough
and, where insurance is concerned, do not allow risk to be
differentiated in a stable, appropriate way, since
underconsumption of insurance is a problem for large
sections of society, not just the poor. This is why there is a
need for insurance policies that entrench risk diversification
and solidarity in different markets: the health-care market,
the labour market, the pensions market, etc.
1. Insurance in the market, premiums and social
value
To begin this analysis, a definition of insurance is
required. What is meant by insurance are all those
transactions whereby payment of a given sum entitles
a person to receive another payment if certain events
occur. Since all individuals are exposed to a particular
set of risks, they obtain a benefit by reducing their
overall risk through diversification. Insurance in the
market allows risk to be transferred to an agency that is
able to cope with them because of its opportunities for
diversification, thus enabling individuals to engage in
risky activities (Arrow, 2000, pp. 220-229). Insurance
can narrow the gap between actual incomes and desired
incomes in different circumstances. It is analogous to
saving, which narrows the gap between income and
consumption levels over different points in time
(Ehrlich and Becker, 2000, p. 171).
9
 This can be seen from statements like the following: “Moral hazard
may not be an insurmountable problem if social insurance mimics
the market as much as possible” (De Ferranti, Perry and others,
2000, p. 42; my italics). Meanwhile, there is a huge literature,
starting with Arrow (1963), on this very subject of moral hazard in
the insurance market.
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The ideal situation for everybody would be a
market in which people were free to insure themselves
against any economically important event, at prices
determined by the equilibrium of the relationship
between supply and demand. The reality has always
been far different from this; not all the forms of risk
transfer that would be desirable can be carried out
through the market, and this creates problems that
society confronts in different ways. Since the pricing
system is unable to deal properly with certain risks, its
use is limited, so that market insurance is restricted in
both coverage and amount. For example, the limitations
of private health insurance mean that large medical
expenses –the very ones it would be most desirable to
insure– go uncovered (Arrow, 2000, pp. 220-229).
Certain insurance markets in the region are either
non-existent or are not properly developed. In addition,
though, the price/income ratio in countries where
income concentration is particularly high means that
the insurance needs of the population cannot translate
into effective demand when earnings are low or there
are spells of unemployment, factors that result in
underconsumption of insurance.
Over and above the intrinsic characteristics of
insurance as an economic good and the potential
consequences of these, furthermore, if the values of
justice and equity are linked to those of effectiveness
and efficiency, then certain goods and services are
defined as entitlements on the basis of these values.
This is a political process: in representative
governments, agreement is reached on the spheres of
action and resources needed to meet social aspirations
or to deal with aggregate social conditions that, in the
present case, may relate to insurance (Moore, 2001,
p. 30).
Both the level and the distribution of the production
of social value, which expresses the joint preferences
of citizens in a political system in relation to the
satisfaction of an aggregate social condition and which
entails particular social obligations, are determined by
citizens acting in the sphere of politics rather than by
consumers acting in the market. In decision-making
terms, political dialogue is to the public realm what the
market is to private efforts, with the peculiarity that it
has a representative character, deals with what is
desirable for society as a whole and involves discussion
of principles and values. The resources needed to solve
problems deemed to be of public interest are limited,
as is the public authority or moral obligation associated
with them. Thus, politics is the response of liberal
democracy to the question, not resolved by analytical
means, of what things should be produced for collective
purposes out of public resources. The case of insurance
concerns fiscal resources and compulsory contribution
systems with risk differentiation (Moore, 2001, pp. 41,
43, 44 and 49).
The fact that financing is required to deal with the
challenges of equity and the synergies between social
development and economic development suggests a
need for fiscal pacts in the countries to determine
protection levels, as political agreements and economic
feasibility permit (ECLAC, 2000).
The singularity of certain goods in relation to
insurance also needs to be considered. It might be
thought that anything subject to loss could be valued
in the relevant markets and that insurance could provide
for full or partial reinstatement in the form of monetary
compensation (as in the case of a car that is involved in
a road accident, for example). However, there are things
that have no adequate market substitutes, such as loss
of life, or the loss of health, with non-monetary
components such as pain, disablement or suffering
(Dionne and Harrington, 2000, p. 12). Because there
are no perfect substitutes for some permanent sources
of benefit, such as good health, there are strictly
speaking no markets in these, although individuals may
set a particular monetary value on them. These
valuations can vary, and this is taken into account in
theories about behaviour in the face of risk; for example,
because it might result in a tendency for less insurance
to be purchased in the market (Cook and Graham, 2000,
pp. 207 and 214) and thence in a situation of
underinsurance that entails individual and social costs.
In these situations, the idea of compulsory insurance
makes sense as a way of dealing with “free riders”.
Where health is concerned, insurance policies, the
health-care systems developed, preventive health
policies and a culture of health are all factors that can
delay or prevent a definitive loss of good health; thence
the importance of insurance, which can provide access
to preventive and curative services when they are
needed. Appropriate insurance can deal with reversible
situations of morbidity that have insurable market
substitutes, i.e., the cost of restoring health, while a
lack of protection can lead to irreversible situations of
morbidity for which there are no market substitutes.
2. Insurance, public goods and externalities
To gauge the importance of insurance in the region,
consideration needs to be given to the public good
aspects it might have, or the combination of public good
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and private good, or its externalities. Theory has laid
down a demanding standard for pure public goods: that
there should be no rivalry in consumption, i.e., no
conflict whatsoever between different individuals’
consumption. Since it is undesirable for individuals to
be excluded from access to these goods by price, they
need to be provided through other sources of income.
How the market performs will depend crucially on the
characteristics of the public good in terms of the
likelihood of exclusion, the number of individuals
benefiting from it, the existence of substantial benefits
for direct consumers, economies of scale in its
production, and the legal and institutional framework
within which transactions take place. This complex of
factors is held to make generalization difficult, beyond
the observation that private markets tend to
underprovide public goods and overprovide public ills.
Many of the services made available by governments
have a mixture of public and private provision or
financing. Political decisions about the provision and
financing of public goods all have their own distributive
implications and are mingled with considerations of
economic efficiency. It is rightly pointed out that these
processes need to be better understood, with political
variables being incorporated into normative models of
public good provision (Oakland, 1991, pp. 492, 509
and 533).
Net social product is increased when other benefits
exceed those obtained directly by individuals from a
transaction, so that a subsidy is required to cover
externalities not reflected in market demand; fiscal
instruments can be used to take account of externalities
(Musgrave, 1985, p. 11).
Against this background, it needs be explained why
it is important for insurance to have redistributive
objectives and pursue stable risk diversification by
means of compulsory contributions or public financing
for the indigent.
Two important considerations relating to the social
impact of individual welfare justify society in using
the public budget to guarantee citizens access to
particular social services as merit goods. It needs to be
understood that, because of the externalities of
individual welfare, there is a close relationship between
this and social welfare. Nor can society and individuals
opt out of public or quasi-public goods, as one of the
singular characteristics of these is the impossibility of
ceasing to consume them, or at least to consume their
externalities, without leaving the community that
supplies them (Hirschman, 1970). This is manifested
in many and various ways: the private lives of citizens,
civic security and the competitiveness of nations in an
open, globalized world are in practice affected by the
quality of public health and education, and by the degree
of social integration.
It is also relevant to consider both the
microeconomic dimensions of certain aspects of
insurance and the macroeconomic repercussions to
which it can give rise. When wages are flexible, the
cost of the benefits provided by an employer is partially
transferred to the worker in the form of lower wages; if
workers do not value these benefits as much as the
earnings foregone, they may seek work in the
deregulated sector, where all remuneration is monetary.
This can occur when the provision of social security or
medical benefits is very inefficient or the link between
benefits and contributions is very weak, or if some
member of the family who is already working in the
formal sector provides cover for the whole family.
Along with information asymmetries and weak property
rights, poor quality and inefficiency in social security
systems have been identified as factors in the isolation
of microenterprises from the market (De Ferranti, Perry
and others, 2002, box 5.5 and p. 145).
From the standpoint of this paper, these conclusions
suggest an argument in favour of insurance reforms,
considering that social security failings or poor medical
benefits are negative externalities that do not create an
adequate incentive for deeper labour markets.
On the subject of externalities, the strategies used
by poor and middle-income households to cushion
shocks (when social safety nets are inadequate and
insurance markets undeveloped) may in some cases be
effective in protecting consumption levels, but are not
necessarily very productive. This being so, inadequate
or non-existent insurance affects both the allocation and
the availability of household resources.10  Conversely,
it is worth reflecting here on the positive repercussions
that insurance may have for economic growth: assuming
that saving generates growth and that there is a close
link between household and national saving, it is
interesting to consider insurance as a determinant of
household saving, with macroeconomic repercussions.
If each individual is not an island, social insurance is
one of the mechanisms that, by diversifying risk, acts
to smooth and stabilize fluctuations in consumption,
thus overriding independent individual strategies of
saving and dissaving over time (Deaton, 1997, pp. 335-
400).
10
 This is a reformulation of points made by Baulch and Hoddinott
(2000), pp. 19-21.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 0  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 3124
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY, INSURANCE AND RISK DIVERSIF ICATION IN  LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  •  ANA SOJO
3. Equity, risk selection and social financing
We should not overestimate the potential of informal
or market-based risk instruments for coping with
idiosyncratic risks: without proper risk diversification,
exclusion and inequality will occur.
In the absence of regulation and premium
restrictions, the norm in competitive markets is for
medical plans to set premiums that are adjusted to
individual risk: this is what is known as the
equivalence principle. Plans vary according to
observable risks, and packages of benefits are designed
to attract particular types of risks. When the costs of
the risk are very high, plans may exclude some existing
medical conditions from the coverage or deny
insurance to high-risk individuals (Van de Ven and
Ellis, 2000, p. 759).
To reconcile efficiency with considerations of
justice and equity, there is a crucial place for risk
adjustment mechanisms that spread risk widely. The
shortcomings of these mechanisms mean there are
always incentives for risk selection in medical plans in
competitive markets: the better the explicit subsidies
for major risks, the less will be the trade-off between
the objectives of efficiency and justice. Risk-adjusted
subsidy systems seek to provide explicit subsidies for
high-risk individuals; conversely, regulation of plan
design and limits on the extent to which individual
contributions may vary are a way of having low-risk
individuals implicitly subsidize high-risk individuals
(Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000, pp. 762 and 763).
Information asymmetries mean that entry and
transaction costs are high and may lead insurers to set
high policy rates (Belli, 2001, p. 21).
As for pensions, in pension systems that are
individually funded, either wholly or in part, risk is
borne individually and differentiated by sex. The bias
against women that results from these systems has had
unexpected consequences, particularly as regards the
welfare of women and their children, and the family
economy.
There are a number of arguments for redistributing
risk. First, there are considerations of equity, the idea
being that the elderly, the chronically ill and other high-
risk groups should be guaranteed decent coverage.
Second, there is a life-cycle argument: young people
or those whose health risk is low are willing to pay out
more than they get back because in future they may
benefit in turn from subsidized coverage. Even in a static
situation, they may be willing to provide subsidies as a
way of obtaining coverage that is closer to their
preference for a comprehensive insurance contract
(Belli, 2001, p. 18; ECLAC, 2000).
Annual contracts that are varied in accordance with
a person’s observable medical condition (e.g., using
“experience rating”, which takes account of new
medical conditions or existing illnesses) go against the
idea of intertemporal insurance, i.e., the right for people
to buy future medical coverage at moderate cost even
after they have fallen ill (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000,
p. 564). Looked at from a dynamic perspective, benefits
that are spread across generations or among people with
different health conditions also represent intertemporal
individual benefits to differing degrees. Furthermore,
compulsory saving by the healthy against periods of
acute or chronic illness has positive microeconomic and
macroeconomic effects, as it increases household saving
and smoothes consumption.
Social financing of health insurance has
redistributive objectives, since it allows for cross-
subsidies among income, age and risk strata. Such
financing normally comes from compulsory
contributions or the national budget. The principle of
solidarity that gives effect to the universality of
insurance enables account to be taken of different
aspects that are not properly dealt with by the price
system. For example: individuals should not have to
meet all the costs associated with their current risk
structure; protection is needed against risks relating to
goods (such as sound health) that do not have an
adequate market substitute; market prices do not reflect
the social opportunity costs or externalities of private
consumption and the public good aspects that this
consumption may have; there is a need to address the
underconsumption associated with low incomes or high
individual risk, when there is no access to insurance
even where the market exists. This provides a way of
correcting externalities, since the benefit from the
insurance accrues not only to the person taking out the
policy but also to society, which benefits from
externalities of different kinds: a healthy population,
fewer social upheavals, etc.
Social insurance based on solidarity principles
provides a way of controlling the efficiency with which
resources, financing and provision are allocated, i.e.,
efficiency in pursuit of both microeconomic and social
objectives, along with equity (ECLAC, 2000).
We have already seen that when insurance is
voluntary, the equivalence principle generally leads to
exclusion, and the conditions of unregulated private
insurance inevitably result in explicit exclusion (e.g.,
of those with chronic or congenital diseases) or high
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premiums, deductibles or copayments which represent
barriers to entry.
Compulsory insurance, conversely, by including
and retaining people at low risk, makes it possible to
operate by a logic different from that of private
insurance and achieve stable risk differentiation. Social
insurance may be run by private-sector insurers; its
financing may come from compulsory premiums paid
by workers and employers or by workers only, or from
general taxation; but in either case its logic is
substantially different from that of private insurance,
as it breaks the identity between individual risks and
premiums and establishes risk coverage on more
general terms, so that it can include some who are not
normally covered by individual insurance policies
(Barr, 1993, pp. 123-128 and 308). Generally speaking,
compulsory insurance operates with a long-term
perspective: because guarantees are applied generally
and not to subgroups categorized by risk, individuals
are not reclassified if their risks increase (Arrow, 1963,
p. 904).
Stable risk differentiation, which has obvious
effects on equity, also affects efficiency. Adverse
selection phenomena reduce the latter and in extreme
cases can result in the bankruptcy of insurers, the so-
called “death spiral” (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000, pp.
606-625; Cutler, 2002, pp. 83-86).
From an individual point of view, subsidies are
dynamic, since individuals will provide or receive
subsidies over their lifetimes as their risk levels vary.
The equivalence between the price of insurance and
the degree of risk is then established at the system level
rather than at the level of the individual premium, within
the framework of what can be very diverse public-
private combinations.
The magnitude and depth of the region’s social and
economic risk raise doubts about its fiscal capacity for
dealing with the challenges of social risk. Redistributive
instruments, with stable risk diversification in insurance
mechanisms and the solidarity of compulsory financing,
help increase financing capacity.
For those who are too poor to afford social services
and protections on their own, social financing out of
the public budget ensures that solidarity will not
undermine the financial soundness of the saving and
insurance functions carried out by the institutions
involved with these services.
Meanwhile, the way idiosyncratic risks can turn
into catastrophic risks also signals a need to consolidate
universal, socially financed health policies in the region.
Given the region’s advanced stage in the
epidemiological transition, the challenges come from
chronic and degenerative diseases, which are costly and
for which preventive policies are required. The
challenge is to find appropriate financing methods and
to create health systems whose providers form efficient
referral networks in different public-private
combinations, as circumstances require.
In the region’s polarized epidemiological
transition, it is among the poor that morbidity and
mortality rates are high for both pre-transitional and
post-transitional diseases. But idiosyncratic health risks
can become catastrophic for sectors with good incomes
as well, owing to the high cost of some chronic and
degenerative diseases; this highlights the importance
of risk diversification, solidarity and the regulation of
exclusion. Consequently, while immunization, public
health campaigns and preventive measures to safeguard
the health of mothers and infants are indispensable,
prevention cannot be the long-term focus of efforts,
nor should concern about insurance for catastrophic
risks be limited solely to the effects these risks have on
the poor, whatever some postulates of the World Bank
(2000) maintain.
One important aspect of insurance markets are
information asymmetries. The information needed to
make rational choices that take the nature, quality and
price of products into account often cannot be used even
if it is available, as it is complex and therefore not well
understood. There are limitations of knowledge, time,
judgement or power, or considerations of other kinds
come into the decision. Power and knowledge, by and
large, are closely linked to socio-economic status (Barr,
1993, p. 296). In situations of uncertainty, information
becomes a commodity that is most likely to be
possessed by those who can pay for it and benefit most
from it (Arrow, 1963, p. 946).
Given the complexities of the insurance market,
then, it is rash to make assertions as all-embracing as
this one: “The critical difference between market
insurance and self-insurance is that the former uses
pooling to spread risk across individuals” (De Ferranti,
Perry and others, 2000, p. 38). The following analogy
is likewise confusing: “Under one rather strict
interpretation, the public policy analogs of the
individual’s insurance and self-protection problem are
social insurance (government actions to augment
market insurance and self-insurance) and social
protection (government actions to augment self-
protection)” (ibid.).
With social safety nets, compulsory contributions
and the solidarity principle in financing are vital, as
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they increase resources, make risk diversification fairer
and more stable and allow cross-subsidy to take place.
They also inculcate a sense of civic responsibility for
the needs of others11  in a system of insurance and social
protection that, by attenuating risks and raising the level
of welfare and certainty, foster simultaneously social
cohesion, civic rights and international competitiveness.
4. The fiscal costs of risk selection
and individualized insurance
Pro-marketeers often establish spurious relationships
between the privatization of welfare systems and
benefits to the public finances, the argument being that
the latter will be freed from the obligations associated
with the welfare State. The situation with privatization
and the interaction between market insurance and fiscal
responsibilities, however, prove far more complex when
the more radical experiences of the region are analysed.
Discarding the principle of solidarity and
compulsory insurance systems which spread risk
widely, and promoting individual insurance without
regulating adverse selection, has entailed large fiscal
costs and entrenched inequality in the region. This is
very well illustrated by the current discussion in Chile
about a social health fund to overcome the sui generis
duality of a health system funded by compulsory
contributions which allows people to opt for public- or
private-sector provision but which, despite being
compulsory, is governed by a dual logic. The public
sector operates on the principle of solidarity, while in
the private sector the benefits and pricing of individual
plans are adjusted annually by the risk level of the
insured in accordance with sex, age and state of health.
In this context, with no barriers to access, the public
sector is the reinsurance instrument of the health
insurance institutions (ISAPRE), which are private.
Chile has also had a pension system reform. There
is now a private-sector defined-contribution system of
individual accounts in which there is no element of
redistribution among contributors. After two decades,
it is proving difficult to consolidate coverage of the
population. Lower-income workers are more likely to
remain outside the pension system. A great fiscal effort
has been required to finance the transition from the old
system. The operating costs of the new system are high,
and although it has helped develop the capital markets,
its direct effect on productive investment seems to have
been modest. Given the number of workers employed
in activities where coverage is discontinuous and the
frequency of episodes of unemployment and
underemployment, it is likely that a large proportion
of subscribers will ultimately qualify for State-funded
social security or minimum pensions. Differentiation
by sex in actuarial pension calculations results in lower
pensions for women, and this affects subsidiary fiscal
contributions (Uthoff, 2001, pp. 35-36; Arenas de Mesa,
2000).
IV
The social risk management proposal
and its implications for the region
As part of the thinking about economic and social risk
in the region and about insurance markets, the social
risk management proposal for Latin America put forward
at the beginning of the millennium is important, as it
combines a particular outlook on insurance policies with
comprehensive proposals for social policy.12  Although
its influence on public policy design may be limited by
the rather hermetic terminology employed, it is worth
analysing this proposal because of its paradigmatic
ambitions, in respect not only of insurance policies but
also of the struggle against poverty and the delimitation
of the public sphere, where it minimizes the responsibility
of society for dealing with economic insecurity. Unlike
the reductionist approach to targeting policies that
emerged in the wake of structural adjustment,13  it
11
 This in turn requires mechanisms to discourage different forms
of moral hazard behaviour.
12
 This analysis is essentially based on six documents: Holzmann
and Jorgensen (2000), World Bank (2000 and 2001) and Holzmann
(2001). Similar positions in a wider context are taken in De Ferranti,
Perry and others (2000).
13
 The reductionist approach gained ground in the 1980s when
bodies such as the World Bank, as part of proposals to privatize
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attaches importance to the causes of poverty and makes
use of insurance terminology.
1. Delimiting social policy
The analysis of social risk management rightly points
out that all individuals are vulnerable to numerous risks
of different kinds, and it interrelates risk, risk exposure
and vulnerability. A risk is an event that may damage a
person’s welfare and that is uncertain as to its timing
and the extent of the harm it may cause. Exposure is
the likelihood of a risk occurring. Vulnerability
measures resistance to shocks, the likelihood of these
resulting in a loss of that welfare which is first and
foremost a function of household asset levels, insurance
mechanisms and the severity and frequency of the shock
concerned (World Bank, 2000, p. 2). A social safety
net is defined as public action that helps individuals,
households and communities to deal with risk and that
supports the poorest; such action should create mutually
supportive relationships with the areas of education and
health, in pursuit of human capital development (World
Bank, 2000, p. 31).
Setting out from the subject of risk and insurance,
a comprehensive social policy proposal is formulated.
This combines three fundamental positions and
proposes a public-private combination whose character
and delimitations are functional to them: the social
welfare responsibilities of the State are confined to the
struggle against poverty; risk insurance is designated
as an individual responsibility; and solidarity in risk
diversification is essentially ruled out.
In these terms, individual insurance in the market,
the use of safety nets to provide services to the poor
and targeting as opposed to universality all go to make
up a social policy strategy that assigns a minimal role
to the public sector in social protection, places the
financing and provision of the remaining social welfare-
related services in private hands and once again departs
from the solidarity principle in financing.
Thus, an analogy can be drawn with the
reductionist targeting proposals first put forward in the
1980s, which set out from the issue of poverty to
propose a similar paradigm for social policy.
2. Poverty, risk and social policy
Rather than helping people to deal with risks, it is
proposed that policies should seek to reduce and
mitigate these. The poor are more vulnerable because
they are more exposed, have little access to assets and
are ill-equipped, in terms of capabilities and resources,
to administer those they do have. For the same reason,
they are supposedly risk-averse14  and have little
opportunity to diversify risks, engage in high-yield
activities or participate in appropriate formal and
informal arrangements. Furthermore, their self-
protection mechanisms are expensive and inefficient,
reduce and impair their fragile human capital and result
in chronic poverty with negative long-term and
intergenerational effects (World Bank, 2000, pp. ii, iii,
6, 17, 20, 26 and 27).
Thus, by contrast with the reductionist targeting
proposals of the 1980s and 1990s, which centred on
the symptoms of poverty rather than its causes, this
approach deals firmly with causes.
There is continuity, however, as regards the action
of the State in the area of social welfare. To create
human, physical, natural and financial assets for the
poor, it is proposed that social spending on basic
services should be increased and that guarantees of
service access, quality, choice and follow-up should
be provided (World Bank, 2000, pp. 8, 15, 19, 32, 34,
38 and 40). But the poor are treated almost as the sole
target group of social policy, while State action is
considered synonymous with safety nets, understood
not necessarily as a broad social network but as a
modular system of programmes operating flexibly as
social policies and limit solidarity in their financing, called for
targeted programmes to concentrate public social spending on the
most vulnerable groups and for the dismantling of universal
services, which were branded as undesirable en masse by the
analytical twist of extrapolating the regressiveness of programmes
such as pensions to universal entitlements generally. An all-
embracing view of social policy was elaborated: whereas universal
provision was very costly and inefficient, targeting would enable
governments to reduce poverty more cheaply and effectively. As
regards sectoral morphology, countries were urged to strengthen
primary health care and primary education at the expense of the
other levels. Last but not least, the emphasis on temporary safety
nets, which were supposed to cushion the impact of adjustment
programmes, shifted interest from the causes of poverty, a subject
that had received attention in the 1970s, to its symptoms. The
controversial, radical nature of this approach led to debate even
within the World Bank itself (essentially at a technical level), and
its global view of social policy has been eroded by considerations
of very different kinds, formulated even within the World Bank as
well as in other bodies (Sojo, 1990 and 1999).
14
 The idea that risk aversion is a specific attribute of the poor is
misleading, particularly since it is a key assumption of insurance
theory that people in general are risk-averse, which is why insurance
makes sense.
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specific patterns of risk require. This system
complements existing arrangements in an appropriate
mix of public- and private-sector providers and includes
schemes and instruments (such as social funds,
microinsurance, health insurance, pensions,
unemployment insurance and social assistance
programmes) to support both immediate consumption
and the accumulation of physical, social and human
assets to provide a way out of poverty.
Safety nets should be created before crises or
upheavals occur, and should be permanent if they are
to help prevent and manage risks, whether by reducing
or cushioning them. They should also help support those
who are at risk of poverty, preventing them from
suffering irreversible harm and broadening political
support for programmes of stabilization and reform
(World Bank, 2000, pp. 40, 135, 147, 166, 169 and
170).
Where Latin America is concerned, the proposal
takes an excessively positive view of social funds, which
are described as tried and tested products for policy
makers that have yielded positive results in terms of
targeting, impact, comparative advantages and cost. It
is claimed that they have begun to address the causes
of poverty and not just the consequences of structural
adjustment, and their impact is even exaggerated, as
they are described as prevalent in the region (World
Bank, 2000, pp. iii, vi, 14 and 15).
This view of social funds largely contrasts with
the findings of the interesting review carried out recently
by the World Bank itself, which questions,
circumscribes or qualifies certain characteristics held
since the 1980s to constitute the advantages of these
funds, and which proposes changes to the World Bank
policy approach in this area. This review does not see
any trade-off between supply- and demand-oriented
policies and it stresses the need to consider the specific
institutional variables of each country so that funds can
be positioned strategically (avoiding short-termism or
isolation) and sustainably, complementing the relevant
institutions without blocking policy reform (World
Bank, 2002, pp. 45-50).
The contents of this review largely coincide with
different criticisms that have been made of the actual
performance of these bodies: their underfunding relative
to traditional social security schemes or programmes
prior to adjustment; their limited repeatability and
continuity, owing to the large salaries paid to their
managers, the good quality of their administrative
infrastructure and their relative dependence on copious
external financing; their low coverage, so that they have
little impact on poverty reduction, job creation or
income redistribution; their inadequate linkage with
sectoral policies; their targeting difficulties; the
sustainability problems of the projects undertaken; the
inequalities resulting from demand subsidy; the poor
quality of the jobs created (which tend to be temporary
and low-skilled, pay less than the poverty line and have
a strong gender bias); and failure to spread the
organizational innovations achieved (Godoy and
Rangel, 1998; Cornia, 1999).
The social risk management proposal likewise
attributes very positive characteristics to informal risk
insurance, also known as microinsurance, failing to give
due weight to information asymmetries in unformalized
relationships and leadership styles and to the constraints
represented by the tendency of the poor to favour
present consumption owing to the pressure of need
(Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2000, p. 10; World Bank,
2000, pp. vi, 25, 26 and 31).
Overestimating the supposedly positive features of
informal insurance mechanisms, which at bottom are
evidence of social vulnerability, may prevent due stress
being laid on the need to move towards formal insurance
and on the conditions that would gradually bring this
about.
In the developed countries, modern social
protection institutions originated partly in mutual
insurance organizations, in cooperatives where people
saved for consumption and home ownership, and in
unions and friendly societies (Norton, Conway and
Foster, 2001).15  And without going further afield, the
quasi-public health insurers known as obras sociales
and mutuales in Argentina and Uruguay had a similar
origin.
3. Market insurance
Public-sector schemes in developing countries are
judged to be relatively few and limited in coverage,
mainly owing to fiscal constraints and low formal
employment. Insurance markets are described as almost
non-existent, owing to problems of information
asymmetry and constraints on contract enforcement,
15
 In Britain, for example, these civil society institutions, which
played a vital role in constructing social capital during
industrialization, shaped an organizational culture and ideology
that contributed to the growth of the labour movement,
representative government and the welfare State, which took on a
wide range of social protection functions (Norton, Conway and
Foster, 2001, p. 44).
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and the proportion of informal employment is pointed
to as evidence of the importance of informal
arrangements where risk is concerned (Holzmann and
Jorgensen, 2000, p. 10; World Bank, 2000, pp. 25 and
31).
The Latin America and Caribbean region is
considered heterogeneous as regards income and the
existence of social risk management mechanisms, and
it is suggested that many countries’ public-sector
mechanisms are of the type developed in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries; the proposal for this
region combines a variety of components. Firstly, the
importance of informal risk mitigation mechanisms is
stressed, given that the formal-sector workforce still
averages only about half the total. It is then proposed
that these countries lay less emphasis on government-
provided risk mitigation mechanisms (and the
contribution rates for social security programmes they
entail) and informal provision, and that they emphasize
and promote market-based risk mitigation instruments.
In other words, they should move away from the left
and right sides of the social risk management matrix
(table 3) and make “vertical moves” within it so that
they can attend more to risk reduction. They should
also strengthen safety nets for potential crisis situations
(World Bank, 2001, p. 70).
These propositions are subsidiary to the insurance
proposals centring on individuals, which clearly define
the sphere of public action and risk diversification, as
the following analysis sets out: “With an approach that
is individual-centered, the need for government arises
only where markets fail and social policy formulation
is based on minimalistic and not ad hoc principles. The
role of government here –driven by efficiency concerns
in an environment of risk– is to augment markets; that
is, to facilitate insurance and self-protection by
providing instruments if markets for them do not exist
(for example, in the case of unemployment insurance),
or through interventions to improve the quality of
instruments if individuals are using inferior modes of
insurance” (De Ferranti, Perry and others, 2000, p. 42).
With this approach, government “social insurance”
measures to broaden risk diversification are essentially
policies to increase market insurance; consequently, the
social insurance measures that are supported (such as
disability insurance) are very limited.16  Compulsory
schemes without risk diversification should thus
increase self-insurance, and social protection policies
that facilitate human capital acquisition should increase
self-protection (De Ferranti, Perry and others, 2000,
p. 42).
As regards risk diversification in the insurance
market, compulsory participation in risk pools is
accepted as desirable to avoid problems of adverse
selection, but is held to be relevant only when there are
no market mechanisms or these collapse or become
dysfunctional (World Bank, 2000, p. 25; Holzmann and
Jorgensen, 2000, p. 10).
Such risk diversification is discouraged and
contrasted with market insurance. Finally, risk is best
coped with by a combination of market insurance, self-
insurance and self-protection. Policy makers should
recognize this, and note especially that the insurance
market with risk diversification is highly failure-prone.
The best solution is usually to correct and complement
the market, rather than replacing it. Thoughtful
regulation is vital for this, whether in labour or financial
markets or in health services (De Ferranti, Perry and
others, 2000, p. 123).
This reductionism in social policy –which limits
public responsibility for social protection to safety-net
policies targeted on the poor, and which in this case
promotes individual insurance, rejecting the principle
of solidarity in a social insurance regime or accepting
risk pooling through compulsory contributions only at
the margin– once again puts off the vigorous social
policies and adequate social investment that are needed
if Latin America and the Caribbean are to participate
more effectively in a globalized world, with greater
social integration and well-being. Although social
investment funds and microinsurance are appropriate
in certain circumstances, a public policy that is reduced
to such instruments will not deal with today’s economic
and social risk and the challenges of economic and
social development in all their magnitude and depth.
16
 Unemployment insurance is considered in De Ferranti, Perry and
others (2000), however; this would have very great fiscal implications
in Latin America, with its weak labour markets and volatility.
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TABLE 3
Strategies and arrangements of social risk management: matrix and examples
Arrangements and strategies Informal Market-based Public
Risk reduction • Less risky production • In-service training • Public labour standards
• Migration • Financial market literacy • Pre-service training
• Proper feeding and • Company-based and market- • Labour market policies
weaning practices driven labour standards • Child labour interventions
• Engaging in hygiene and • Disability policies
other disease-preventing • Good macroeconomic policies
activities • AIDS and other disease
prevention
• Legislation to remove gender
inequalities in property rights,
marriage and access to labour
markets
Risk mitigation
Portfolio • Multiple jobs • Investment in multiple • Multipillar pension systems
• Investment in human, financial assets • Asset transfers
physical and real assets • Microfinance • Protection of property rights
• Investment in social capital (especially for women)
(rituals, reciprocal • Support for extending
gift-giving) financial markets to poor
people
Insurance • Marriage/family • Old-age annuities • Mandated/provided insurance
• Community arrangements • Disability, accident, and other for unemployment, old age,
• Share tenancy personal insurance disability, survivorship,
• Tied labour • Crop, fire, and other damage sickness, etc.
insurance
Risk coping • Selling of real assets • Selling of financial assets • Transfers/social assistance
• Migration • Borrowing from banks • Subsidies
• Borrowing from neighbours • Public works
• Intra-community
transfers/charity
• Sending children to work
• Dissaving in human capital
Source: Prepared by the World Bank (2001, table 2.2, p. 15).
V
The financing challenge
As a variety of studies have shown, there is an urgent
need for the countries of the region to initiate or extend,
as the case may be, reforms to social protection systems
in different spheres: protection against risks associated
with greater insecurity of employment; wider coverage
for pension systems; measures to deal with the
difficulties encountered by the State in meeting its fiscal
responsibility for minimum, basic or social security
pensions; risk management in pension funds during
financial crises, and management of the funds
themselves; improving the poor coverage, efficiency
and equity of programmes to address unemployment;
and increasing medical coverage and the quality of
provision. Again, if competition is promoted in medical
insurance and provision, regulatory capabilities need
to be strengthened in relation to risk selection, cross-
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subsidies from the public sector to the private sector,
bloated financial and insurance intermediation, and high
transaction costs when functional separation has been
carried out to create quasi-markets.
In terms of social risk, the great heterogeneity of
the labour market and the enormous size of the informal
sector place special demands on social policy, while
restricting the tax base for social policy financing from
compulsory contributions or the fiscal budget.
This being the case, there is a crucial role for
policies that seek to reduce any trade-offs in financing,
for example as regards the contributions of different
income groups, or policies that deal with intertemporal
trade-offs in financing provided by the State. As we
shall now see, financing mechanisms act on these with
different objectives in view.17
As has already been seen, social financing and risk
diversification are essential for dealing with the
complexity of insurance markets. As in some pension
systems that combine different forms of contribution
known as “pillars”, furthermore, compulsory individual
contributions should be conditional on a social
contribution, and consideration can be given to optional
individual contributions designed to retain higher-
income sectors, reduce evasion and avoidance and
encourage voluntary saving by income strata that are
above the taxation ceiling for compulsory contributions.
Postponing reforms that involve higher spending
is an option that entails an evaluation of present
spending in relation to future spending and that
expresses intertemporal options influenced, naturally,
by the time horizon of governments and the alternation
in power of political groupings. Putting off social
investment now because of fiscal constraints may
actually lead to considerably greater pressure on public
spending in future.
Consideration should be given, for example, to
those whose low incomes mean they will have to receive
pensions financed out of general taxation when they
retire. Given the dynamic of the situation and the
continuing deterioration in employment quality, it may
be supposed that this contingent is growing all the time.
There is scope, however, for action now to bring those
excluded from the formal labour market into the
contributory system, to minimize the negative impact
of labour market dynamics on non-contributory
financing. From the conceptual and political point of
view, it is worth inquiring into the cost of subsidizing
the contributions of sectors whose saving capacity is
insufficient to meet the combined contributions payable
by the employer and the worker, or by the worker alone
if there is no employer’s contribution; in this case, an
informal worker’s contribution should be set at a level
that does not create spurious incentives for membership
of a subsidized regime.
The cost of this subsidy should be weighed against
the projected future fiscal cost of non-contributory
pensions in the absence of this subsidy to the
contributory regime. Consideration also needs to be
given to the potential benefits of increased public saving
and recognition in the present of what would be a
postponed contingency. Again, there is the question of
how the subsidy should be financed, whether from
specific taxes or a given increase in the tax burden.
Any policy option needs to consider that there is
not just one way for the poor to save. For example,
there is a range of options involving collective
insurance, in which workers’ organizations sign
agreements with an insurer that guarantees them a
redistributive system, risk diversification and lower
transaction and administration costs. The organization
then pays an average subscription per person to an
insurer and risk diversification takes place in association
with a particular cover. The ratio between the average
subscription and the individual subscription determines
the subsidy, but there is no subsidy for the group as a
whole.
As for universality with solidarity-based
funding, dismissing this possibility out of hand or
analysing solidarity only on an excessively micro
scale ignores the historical conditions of our own
region, which have allowed countries as dissimilar
as Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica to progress
gradually towards this goal.
17
 The remarks on financing that follow are based on discussions
with Rebeca Grynspan about ideas formulated by her.
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